actions-cool/issues-helper or actions-cool/maintain-one-comment in my GitHub workflow: was I hit by the Mini Shai-Hulud payload when they were re-enabled (Sept 16-25, 2026)?

Am I affected: you may be if any workflow uses actions-cool/issues-helper or actions-cool/maintain-one-comment by version tag (for example @v2 or @v2.2.1) rather than by a known-clean commit SHA. Both actions were compromised on May 18, 2026 and then removed. Between September 16 and 25, 2026 they were re-enabled with release tags still pointing at the malicious commit, so tagged workflows ran the old payload again. Socket reports that the payload steals CI secrets and that in the September runs it also committed Claude Code and VS Code hook files into the repository. Those hooks are a persistence risk for anyone who later opens the repo in those tools. How to check: - Search all repos and orgs for the action names: GitHub code search 'actions-cool/issues-helper' and 'actions-cool/maintain-one-comment', including reusable workflows. - Review Actions run history for those workflows from May 18, 2026 until the May takedown, and again for Sept 16-25, 2026. Runs that suddenly succeeded after a long run of failures are a red flag. - Check git history for unexpected commits after September 16, 2026, especially new or changed files under .claude/ (settings.json hooks), .vscode/ (tasks.json, settings.json), and workflow files. Fix: - Remove both actions, or replace them with a maintained alternative or a few lines of your own script using the GitHub CLI or API. If you must keep them, pin to a full commit SHA that predates May 18, 2026 and that you have reviewed. - Rotate every secret the affected workflows could read: repository, environment and org secrets, GITHUB_TOKEN-derived access (revoke any PATs or app tokens stored as secrets), cloud keys, and npm/PyPI publish tokens. - Delete injected hook or config files and any commits the payload made, then review branch protection so workflow tokens cannot push to default branches. Interim mitigation: set default workflow permissions to read-only, restrict Actions to an allow-list of approved actions (org settings → Actions → Allow select actions), and require SHA pinning for third-party actions. After cleanup: check cloud and registry audit logs for use of the rotated credentials, look for packages published from your accounts during the windows, and make sure no developer opened the repository in Claude Code or VS Code with the injected hooks still present. If someone did, check those machines too. Sources: https://thehackernews.com/2026/09/compromised-github-actions-came-back.html https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/github-actions-re-enabled-with-mini-shai-hulud-payload-still-active/